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Abstract 
One of the important elements of the modern 
infocommunication infrastructure is satellite communications, 
the main advantage of which is the provision of information 
and communication services on a very large area. This 
circumstance led to the unpunished pirate capture of the 
onboard transponder resources and is a problem of the 
international community since a pirate can be located in the 
territory of any state within the coverage area of space 
communications. The coordinates of a space vehicle, on the 
board of which a transponder is installed, and its 
characteristics are well known, what simplifies the task of 
capturing a frequency resource. The pirate activity leads to a 
violation of the legitimate user rights, who pays for the leased 
frequency band, but cannot use it due to the pirate capture, 
and of the rights of an onboard transponder owner, to whom 
the pirate does not pay for the utilized resource. This requires 
the development of methods, software, and hardware to 
ensure an adequate protection of the information interests of 
the legitimate users of the satellite communications by 
positioning an unknown ground station (UGS). The article 
describes the methods and characteristics of the UGS 
positioning based on the measurements of Doppler shift 
and/or phase delay of signals proportional to the time of the 
radio signal propagation. It is shown that the proposed 
methods allow for the accuracy of the UGS positioning to a 
tenth of a degree. 
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Introduction 
Mass distribution of infocommunication technologies has led 
to the need for protecting the transported information against 
malicious interventions [1, 2]. The satellite communications 
has been widely used for the data transmission, Internet 
access, television, voice messages in the phone mode, etc. As 
one of the communication technologies forms, the satellite 
communications is also exposed to the possibility of malicious 
intervention [3, 4]. 
One scenario for this intervention is as follows. The most 
widely used satellites are those placed in a geostationary orbit 
(GEO). The area illuminated by such satellite is 
approximately 1/3 of the Earth's surface. Therefore, an 
unknown ground station (UGS) can be placed at arbitrary 
points within a rather vast territory [5, 6]. An onboard satellite 
transponder is not protected against the unauthorized access, 
which gives rise to the problem of ensuring information 
security of this type of telecommunications since an illegal 
use of the transponder’s frequency resource is possible. 
According to reports at the Scientific Conference in Dubna 
(Russia) in 1999, the number of registered events of the pirate 
captures of the satellite’s frequency resource reached 200 
cases [7]. By now, the statistics of captures is not published in 
the open press, but the experience shows that such a practice 
takes place. It characterizes the urgency of the problem of 
satellite infocommunication protection against an 
unauthorized use. 
There are knows several proposals dedicated to the solution of 
this problem. In particular, it is possible to install an 
intentional interference for a malicious user as suggested in 
[8] with the aim of ousting the attacker from the operating 
frequency band. This technique has a limited perspective. 
Much more promising is the positioning of the pirated UGS 
location followed by the implementation of legal measures 
including those of the international level. 
One of the first attempts to solve this problem dates from the 
early 1990-ies [3]. It was proposed to use two satellites in a 
geostationary orbit with a small but well-known distance 
between them. The UGS signals to be received by each 
satellite and transmitted to a Measuring Earth Station (MES). 
The UGS coordinates are determined by the difference 
between the signal’s time of arrival to MES and a Doppler 
frequency shift. The experimental testing showed that 
antennas with a diameter of about 20 m are required for 
receiving weak signals. An error value of 150–200 km and 
sometimes 600 km was reached. This method was further 
discussed in [9 ... 13], but has no future as the demand for 
receiving signal by two or more satellites extremely 
complicates the technical implementation. In [14], the authors 
propose a method for radio source positioning when receiving 
radio signals of one radio source using non-linear (including 
circular) antenna systems of arbitrary shape [15] consisting of 
weakly directional and directional elements (vibrators). The 
UGS location is possible through the use of a multi-beam 
antenna on a satellite [15], but this solution has not moved 
beyond the purely theoretical framework because the 
complexity of an onboard antenna and the low positioning 
accuracy, which is determined by the each beam width, 
require further significant development. In [16] it is proposed 
to pre-select the signals from an illegitimate user according to 
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the discrepancy criterion of the complex frequency spectrum 
and the spectrum of wavelet transformation with respect to the 
signals from legitimate users and only then to evaluate the 
coordinates. 
 
 
Positioning based on the Doppler frequency shift 
measurements. 
Fig. 1 schematically shows the layout of a geostationary 
satellite in the geocentric coordinate system at point A. The Z 
axis is directed to the north (N). Satellite coordinates: latitude 
λs and longitude φs. UGS is located on the Earth's surface at 
point B. R1 is the distance from the center of the Earth to the 
satellite, and R2 is the distance to point B (Earth's radius). 
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Figure 1: A schematic layout of a geostationary satellite 
 
The projection to the Earth's surface of the trajectory of a 
geostationary satellite slow motion during the day 
resembles a figure 8 (Bernoulli's lemniscate). This satellite 
motion causes a Doppler frequency shift. If a satellite-
transponder moves relative to a fixed pirated radio source 
(the coordinates of which can be determined) with the 
velocity V and at an angle  to the direction of a 
communication line, then the resulting Doppler shift FD of the 
frequency f0 is given according to [5]: 
)cos(
C
V
fF oD   (1) 
Here, C is the velocity of light in free space. 
 
We will further consider the use of only one satellite for UGS 
positioning with the help of Doppler techniques. Using the 
known coordinates of the satellite and the measured Doppler 
frequency value FD, we can determine the UGS coordinates. 
At a fixed satellite position, the line of the FD constant value 
on the Earth’s surface is a closed second-order curve formed 
by the intersection of cone (at the top of which a satellite is 
located) and the Earth’s surface. The shape of this curve 
depends on the angle α between the satellite’s velocity vector 
and the radius-vector, which is understood as an imaginary 
line connecting the center of the satellite mass and the center 
of the Earth. At α ≈ 0/π, this curve is an ellipse. When the 
angle  deviates from the set value, then the curve of the 
constant values f0 degenerates into a hyperbole. The procedure 
of UGS positioning when the angle α is in the neighborhood 
of points 0 or π. Thus, when the satellite moves away from the 
Earth at a sufficiently long period of time (α ≈ π) or 
approaches the Earth (α ≈ π), then the other components of the 
daily satellite movement can be neglected. The daily 
ephemerides of the geostationary satellites allow allocating 
areas with α ≈ 0 or α ≈ π. Therefore, we will continue to 
consider only  = 0, . 
A subsatellite point is located in the center of the ellipse (point 
С in Fig. 1). It should be noted that Fig. 1 schematically 
shows a satellite with a shift to the north of the geostationary 
orbit. For the above stated reasons, the satellite movement 
leads to a change in the coordinates of the station point and 
the FD value, which corresponds to a different ellipse. The 
UGS coordinates are to be determined at the point of at least 
three ellipses intersection with the known coordinates of the 
centers. The UGS coordinates can be obtained as follows. 
Angle  is determined from (1): 
      
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where FDGS – a Doppler frequency shift on the line satellite – 
measuring earth station path. This option can be easily taken 
into account by a special test signal passing along the line 
MES – satellite – МES of the feedback loops and allows for 
the accurate measurement of FDGS. Angle  is determined from 
(1): 
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where R1 is the satellite’s radius-vector, R2 is the distance 
between the center of the Earth and the point B. The 
coordinates of the ellipse center: х0, y0, z0 
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(4) 
Here, s is the satellite’s longitude. 
As noted above, an UGS is located at the intersection of at 
least three ellipses formed at three different positions of the 
satellite. However, it is easier to search for the intersection 
point of three planes, in which the ellipses are located. 
Moreover, this approach allows determining the coordinates 
of UGS located, for example, on an airplane. The canonical 
form, which defines a plane in the space E, in which the 
ellipses are located, is determined by the following 
expression: 
     E = 0)(()( 000  zzCyyBxxA  , 
where х0, y0, and z0 are the coordinates of a point in a given 
plane, i. e. the ellipse center coordinates. It should be noted 
that these are the coordinates of the satellite’s station point 
projection to the plane Е. А, B, and C are the coordinates of 
the normal vector (А, В, С) to this plane, where А=(х0-х), В= 
(y0 -y) and с=(z0-z). In this case, the beginning of the normal 
vector coincides with the center of the geocentric coordinate 
system, i. e. х=у=z=0. Thus, the plane, in which the ellipse is 
located, and which intersects with the Earth’s surface, is given 
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by the following equation: 
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o
2
o
2
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The solution of the system of three equations for the Doppler 
frequency shift FD at three points of the satellite’s daily 
movement trajectories allows obtaining the target coordinates 
х, у, and z. The transformation of x, y, z into the geographical 
latitude and longitude of UGS is carried out by solving the 
following equation: 
     ,  
The positioning errors are caused by the inaccurate knowledge 
of satellite coordinates and the Doppler frequency 
measurement error. It can be shown that the error in 
determining the latitude and longitude at FD = const is 
respectively equal to: 
     , 
      (6) 
The calculation results are shown in Fig. 2, 3. Here, x, у, z are 
the indirect measurement errors obtained by a Taylor series 
expansion with neglecting the terms of order higher than the 
first one [17]. The calculation results according to (6) are 
shown in Fig. 2, 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The dependence Δλ(λUGS) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The boundaries of working areas. 
 
Fig. 2 shows the dependence of the ∆λ error as a function of 
longitude λUGS. As can be seen, the error increases at the edges 
of the radio coverage zone. The dependence Δφ(φUGS) has the 
same complex variable nature. Based on the estimated 
dependences Δλ(λUGS) and Δφ(φUGS ), the working areas were 
presented graphically (fig. 3). The figure 1 is the "station" 
point, the curve 2 is Δλ(λUGS)=0, the curve 3 corresponds to 
Δφ(φUGS)=0. The figure 4 marks the boundary of the working 
area, within which the error does not exceed 0.10, and in Fig. 
5 – 10. 
During the satellite movement along the daily trajectory, there 
are sections where 21 VV  , the antipodal path sections 
are conditionally designated by the indices 1, 2. In the vicinity 
of these points, the positioning error 21   
and, respectively,
 21
 . It is obvious that 
1 1TRUE     , 2 2TRUE    , where 1  and 2  
are the estimated values of longitude at the first and the 
second points, respectively, TRUE – is the true value of the 
UGS longitude. The following equation is true: 
1 2
2
PR TRUE
 
 
  
 
 
. (7) 
In the area between the figures 3 and 4 in Fig. 3, the errors are 
calculated by (7), and the values for latitude do not exceed 
0.290. All calculations are made for the relative measurement 
error of the Doppler frequency shift FD≈10-3. If for some 
reason the use of Doppler method is impossible, then for the 
measurements it is necessary to use the UGS coordinates 
based on the phase measurements (see below). 
 
iii. Positioning based on the phase measurements. 
Let the antenna array consisting of two pairs of receiving 
antennas be mounted on a satellite fixed in GEO in point А 
(Fig. 1). One pair is oriented in the equatorial plane and 
another one – orthogonally in the meridian plane. Using a 
Krasovsky ellipsoid [6] for describing the Earth’s surface, it is 
possible to get an expression for calculating the target UGS 
latitude and longitude in the geocentric coordinate system: 
 , , 
 where φ and λ are the UGS latitude and longitude, 
respectively;  is the satellite latitude in a station point; 
 is an angle between R and L, 
R is the Earth’s radius; L is the distance from the Earth’s 
center to the geometric center of the antenna array; 
 ,   are the 
angles determining the direction of arrival of a radio wave 
emitted by the UGS transponder; d is the antenna array base; υ 
is the wavelength of the received signal; are the 
phase shifts between the signals received by the receiving 
antenna array elements. 
Thus, by measuring the phase shifts of the signals received by 
an antenna array, it is possible to determine the direction to 
UGS relative to the geostationary satellite. 
The UGS latitude and longitude determination errors depend 
on as follows: 
 The measurement errors of phase differences 

 21  and 

 43 . 
 The inaccuracy of the satellite delivery to the 
stationary point. 
 The per diem evolutions of the satellite position (see 
above). 
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 The error of orienting a satellite array relative to 
meridians and parallels. 
 
The UGS latitude and longitude determination errors due to 
indirect measurements are calculated according to the 
formulas (6). In the calculations, it is assumed that UGS is 
located in the right top quarter of a spheroid 
with
 900  . The spheroid quarters are formed by the 
intersection of the equatorial plane and the meridional plane 
corresponding to the satellite’s station point. The angle 

is 
determined by the UGS position in one quarter of a spheroid. 
The maximum value of the angle is determined by the 
boundary of the illuminating UGS contour due to the 
nonspherical shape of the Earth. For the case 
90  (UGS 
is located on the meridian of the satellite’s station point), 
angle α can take on values from 00 to 8.65 . 
For
0 (UGS is at the equator), angle β= 0 …8.67 . 
Fig. 4 presents the curves of equal errors on the Earth’s 
surface for three error values   (solid lines) and   
(dashed lines). Within each curve, the errors are within the 
allowable limits. The curve built with  is the 
boundary of the radio coverage zone, and the point with the 
coordinates  is named as a subsatellite point on 
the earth’s surface. The errors that lie within the curves are 
characteristic of satellites with an illuminated spot on the 
Earth's surface of any shapes and sizes. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The calculation results for the phase method with 
an antenna array on the satellite. 
 
Fig. 5 shows a block diagram of an apparatus embodying the 
phase method for positioning [18]. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: A block diagram of an apparatus for UGS 
positioning. 
 
Onboard an Artificial Earth Satellite, the apparatus has an 
antenna array consisting of at least four antennas А1, А2, А3, 
and А4. The signals received from the antenna array elements 
are successively transmitted to MES using a commutator and 
the transponder’s transmitter Trans. One axis of the antenna 
array lies in the meridian plane, and the other – in the Earth's 
equatorial plane. The commands to connect antenna array 
elements А1…А4 are generated in the command radio link 
transmitter CRL Trans. Using the same commands, a memory 
device MD stores the signals received in MES from the 
antenna array elements. After reading the signals from all the 
elements А1…А4, the measurement of phase shifts Δφ starts, 
and further – the calculation of coordinates in the computing 
unit CU according to the following formulas: 
, 
 . 
Here, φ and λ are the UGS latitude and longitude, 
respectively.  is an angle 
between R and L; R is the Earth’s radius; L is the distance 
between the Earth’s center and the geometric center of the 
antenna array. , d is the antenna array base. 
 is the longitude of the satellite station point;  and 
 are the phase shifts between the signals received by the 
antenna array elements. 
 
iv. A phase method for the detection finding using a virtual 
antenna array 
The slow satellite movement along the per diem trajectory 
allows for generating a virtual antenna array (VAA) on a basis 
of several in-time successive positions of the satellite [19]. By 
measuring the phase difference between the UGS signals, in 
these positions of the known (or measured with high accuracy 
from the ground control complex) satellite coordinates, it is 
possible to conduct UGS positioning. 
At a fixed satellite position, the line of constant values of the 
difference between phases on the Earth is a closed 
curve produced by the intersection of a cone, the apex of 
which is at the point belonging to the VAA base, and the 
Earth’s surface. The shape of this curve depends on the angle 
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between the VAA base and vector connecting the earth’s 
center of mass with the point А at one of the VAA bases. 
When α = 0, the curve is insignificantly different from the 
circle since the globe is a spheroid. When angle α deviates 
from the normal, the curve of the constant value of the 
difference between phases  becomes an ellipse, and 
further degenerates into a hyperbole. The further 
consideration would be limited to α= 0. 
The VAA projection on the Earth’s surface is in the center of 
the area limited by the curve of constant values of the 
difference between phases . The deviation of the 
satellite orbit from the geostationary one for the reasons stated 
above leads to the change in the point С with the coordinates 
and values , which corresponds to another closed curve. 
The UGS is located at the juncture of at least three closed 
curves, the center coordinates of which are known and varied. 
In order to conduct measurements, an array of clusters is 
generated, each consisting of 3+N elements; the first, the 
second, and the third elements of each cluster are the current 
satellite coordinates, respectively: the distance, the angle of 
site, and azimuth. The rest cluster elements are the values of 
the UGS signal phase at the moment of satellite positioning, 
and the other elements of each cluster present the signal 
phases of the legitimate Earth’s transmitters, the coordinates 
of which are also known at the moment of satellite 
positioning. Then at least four best clusters are selected, which 
are grouped into pairs for generating at least two virtual bases, 
respectively, for calculating the UGS coordinates. A selection 
criterion for a pair of clusters is the proximity of the angle 
therebetween to 900. By using the known coordinates of the 
legitimate transmitters and the results of their calculations of 
the coordinates, it is possible to calculate the measurement 
errors that are taken into account when calculating the UGS 
coordinates. 
The results of the coordinate error calculations based on the 
phase method are shown in Fig. 6. Based on the estimated 
values Δλ(λUGS) and Δφ(φUGS), the working zones are 
presented at  = =0.040 , = 1 km, and  = 10. 
The subsatellite point is at the origin of the coordinates. 
Within each error, the specified limits are not exceeded. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. The calculation results for the phase method with 
VAA 
A common disadvantage of the above methods is the low 
UGS positioning accuracy due to the systematic error, which 
grows with the increasing distance between the UGS and the 
subsatellite point, and to the errors associated with the per 
diem, seasonal, and other changes in the electromagnetic 
characteristics of the signal propagation. The resolution of 
phase ambiguity has been deeply investigated in theory and in 
practice [20]. 
 
v. The ways for enhancing the accuracy of the UGS 
positioning 
The positioning accuracy enhancement can be shown as 
follows by an example of just one geographical coordinate of 
an unknown transmitter. Fig. 7 demonstrates an estimated 
dependence of the determination error of one of the 
coordinates (conditionally designated Y) ΔY0 on the value of 
the Y0 coordinate itself. 
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Figure 7: Dependence ΔY0(Y0) and its approximation. 
 
 
The value Y0=0 corresponds to the subsatellite point when the 
distance between the satellite and the Earth’s surface is 
minimal. If the UGS is located at the subsatellite point then 
the systematic error equals to zero. The error caused by the 
condition of the signal propagation path is unknown and can 
be considerable for any UGS location. Let also the legitimate 
transmitters be located in the positions Y1, Y2, Y3. Since the 
coordinates of the legitimate transmitters are known, then 
using the measurement results, it is easy to calculate the errors 
ΔY1, ΔY2, ΔY3. It is most easy to use stepwise 
approximations of a real error curve (bold line in Fig. 7), and 
calculate the target coordinate according to the rules specified 
in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: A rule for recalculating the coordinate measurement 
results 
 
The measured value YUGS Belongs to 
the interval 
The target value 
YUGS 
0<YUGS<Y1 YUGS=Ymeas 
Y1<YUGS<Y2 YUGS=Ymeas-
Y1+Y1meas 
Y2<YUGS<Y3 YUGS=Ymeas-
Y2+Y2meas 
 
Here, Y1meas, Y2meas are the measured coordinate values of the 
legitimate transmitters ` 1 and 2. Let the UGS be located in 
the position YUGS. Then, as seen in Fig. 7, the error is 0.75°. 
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The error of the coordinate determination by the described 
technique does not exceed 0.25°. The application of other 
approximation methods, for example, a linear method or a 
spline function, with nodes at the location points of legitimate 
transmitters will further enhance the effectiveness of the 
suggested method. 
The second direction for enhancing the coordinate 
measurements accuracy is the account of the measured 
parameter impermanence (phase delay) during the time of 
measurement. The satellite movement causes the changes in 
the measured parameter during the time of measurement, 
which was noted as early as in 1973 [21]. The measured 
parameter comprises a time-dependent component. Therefore, 
the measurement time may not exceed a few milliseconds per 
smallness of this component during the time of measurement. 
This leads to the need for a substantial increase in the 
signal/noise ratio. Assuming that the satellite moves along the 
linear section of the orbit, we can eliminate a variable part 
considering the two adjacent measuring cycles: φx=2Ψ1-Ψ2, 
where Ψ1 and Ψ2, respectively, are the measurement results 
in the first and second cycles. The measurement time of an 
informative component φx can be increased in order to reduce 
the requirements for the signal/noise ratio. 
In order to enhance the UGS positioning accuracy, it is 
necessary to take into account the conditions of the signal 
propagation within all path segments, and use the special 
algorithms of processing [22]. 
 
 
Conclusions 
The methods for determining the UGS coordinates based on 
the Doppler or phase measurements provide for the accuracy 
to a tenth of a degree within a large territory. As the territory 
sizes decline, a more accurate determination of the UGS 
coordinates is ensured. The VAA positioning is inferior to the 
technique using an antenna array onboard the satellite in the 
size of the territory, within which the positioning errors do not 
exceed the specified values. However, this technique is 
technically more preferable because it requires no additional 
satellite hardware debugging and can be used with the modern 
family of running communication satellites. 
Applying the differential techniques based on the use of 
certain sections of trajectories and/or the techniques taking 
into account the error corrections with respect to the known 
UGS coordinates will significantly expand the size of the 
served territory while maintaining an acceptable level of 
accuracy of the UGS positioning, and, as a consequence, the 
protection of satellite infocommunication against an 
unauthorized use. 
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